This paper examines the equilibrium price effects of the privatization of housing assets that were previously owned and allocated by the state. I develop a theoretical framework that shows that privatization can have ambiguous effects on prices in the private market, and that the degree of misallocation of the assets prior to privatization determines the subsequent price effects. I test the predictions of the model using a large-scale housing reform in China. The results suggest that the removal of price distortions allowed households to increase their consumption of housing and led to an increase in equilibrium housing prices. JEL: R28, O18 and P21
State participation in the housing market occurs in several forms in countries throughout the world. The provision of subsidized housing as a welfare benefit to low income households is common throughout the Western hemisphere. In addition, local governments in several cities in the United States have implemented regulations that limit the increase of rents charged by landlords. 1 This paper focuses on a form of state intervention in housing that occurs through the provision of subsidized homes to state employees. The economic consequences of this area of research are potentially large as employer-provided housing in the state sector is common throughout the developing world, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
Government regulation of the private market or the creation of a separate market ensures that certain households have access to housing at prices that are below market value. State interventions that aim to bring affordable housing to particular sub-segments of the population can create economic inefficiencies. They distort the decisions that individuals make regarding residen- The theoretical framework presented in this analysis builds on existing models of rent control.
J.R. Gould and S. G. Henry (1967) challenged the popular belief that the introduction of rent control would unambiguously increase housing prices in the uncontrolled sector. They developed a general equilibrium model to demonstrate that the introduction of price controls can either raise or lower the price of a substitute good. George Fallis and Lawrence B. Smith (1984) introduced a model of housing prices that includes common features of rent control. Their model also found that the impact on housing prices in the uncontrolled market is ambiguous and depends on the response of demand. The theoretical framework in my paper introduces the importance of the degree of misallocation of assets in the controlled sector on housing prices in the uncontrolled sector. 2 I use the term mismatch to capture the difference in the consumption of housing services under the state allocation of housing and under the efficient allocation that results from private market mechanisms. 3 I estimate the degree of misallocation of housing prior to the privatization in China and the equilibrium price effects of removing the system of state allocation. Furthermore, I
calculate the welfare losses associated with this type of housing misallocation.
In my framework, the price of state housing services is highly subsidized and its allocation is controlled by the state. The private market is not controlled by the state in any direct way. The two types of housing are substitutes for a subset of the population that is allowed to reside in state housing. The model shows that the privatization of state-owned housing has an ambiguous effect on equilibrium housing prices in the private market. The intuition behind the ambiguous price effect is that the privatization leads to shifts in both the supply of and the demand for housing.
The model offers insight into misallocation as a key determinant of the relative sizes of the shifts in supply and demand. In particular, the model predicts that the direction and the magnitude of the price impact depend on the degree of misallocation of state housing before the reform.
Using panel data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), I test the predictions of the model using the large-scale housing reform that ended the state provision of subsidized housing in China. My estimates of mismatch suggest that households living in state-owned housing units prior to the reform were consuming approximately 15 percent less housing services than they would have chosen in the private market. The empirical results suggest that the removal of price distortions allowed households to increase their housing consumption. The shift in demand for housing led to a significant increase in the equilibrium price of housing in the private market of 7.5 2 The economic importance of housing misallocation under rent control is emphasized in the existing literature that provides methods for estimating the degree of misallocation in the housing market (Edward L. Glaeser and Erzo F. Luttmer 2006; Edgar O. Olsen 1972) . 3 The theoretical approach used to model the housing market follows a standard approach in the housing literature introduced by Richard F. Muth (1960) and Olsen (1969) . While every house is unique in its location and amenities, the model deconstructs the market into homogenous and divisible units of housing services. Residences differ only in the amount of housing services that they provide; thus, this approach abstracts away from further distinctions between quantity and quality of homes. In this framework, price refers to the price of a single unit of housing services. Ortalo-Magné and Sven Rady (2006) focuses on households that want to trade up into higher quality homes but are constrained by the down-payment requirement. While credit constraints may also be a limiting factor in housing consumption in China, this paper focuses on the distortions in housing consumption that result from the subsidized rental prices of employer-provided housing.
Furthermore, the credit constraints framework only predicts that housing prices should fall after the sale of state-owned housing (Sing, Tsai and Chen 2006); it cannot explain the experience in China where equilibrium housing prices in the private market rose after the privatization of state housing.
Background

Privatization of Public Housing Units
Upon gaining control of the government in 1949, the Communist Party nationalized the ownership of land in China. Households that already possessed private ownership of homes were allowed to retain ownership of their residences, but the government established public ownership over all new housing stock. State-owned housing units were allocated to employees of state-owned enterprises by their work units. The rents charged were highly subsidized. Following the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, the new leadership initiated a gradual reform of the socialist system towards a mixed economy. A reform of the housing system was considered because the government recognized serious problems in the state provision of housing, including shortages, poor management and corruption in the distribution (Ya-Ping Wang and Alan Murie 1999). There were substantial waiting lists for state-owned housing, and allocation was determined by the availability of housing units and worker characteristics, including job tenure, rank and social connections (John R. Logan and Min Zhou 1996) . Private construction of housing was allowed and the supply of private housing expanded. 4 In 1993, approximately 40 percent of urban households in China were residing in state-owned housing.
In July 1994, the State Council of China outlined procedures for state employers to sell public housing units to sitting tenants in urban areas throughout the country. Households living in state-owned housing were given the opportunity to buy either full or partial property rights to their current homes. Partial property rights included use rights for perpetuity, the right to bequeath, the right to rent out the home and the right to use it as collateral for loans. After five years of ownership, households with partial property rights gained the right to sell the home, but shared the profits from the sale with their work units. In contrast, those purchasing full property rights faced no restrictions in the use or sale of their homes and retained all profits earned. In the data used in this analysis, only 18 percent of households that had been occupying state-owned housing had partial property rights following the reform.
Interviews conducted by Deborah S. Davis (1993) of urban residents in China confirm that the central and municipal governments were successful in hiding their plans for privatization of urban housing assets from most of the population through the early 1990s. In addition to qualitative evidence from interviews, empirical evidence by Wang (2008) also supports the idea that reform 4 While the state owned all land during this period, private sector firms were able to purchase land use rights for 70 years. Land use rights included the right to participate in secondary markets and rent out the use of the land to others. These initial prices were set by public tender, auction or negotiation. See Samuel P. Ho and George C. Lin (2003) for more details on the land use rights.
was unanticipated prior to 1994. Furthermore, the results in this paper in Section 3.3.3.3 also provide evidence against the idea that anticipation of the reform impacted the relationship between misallocation and housing consumption or prices.
The prices charged for state-owned housing units was far below market value, and the vast majority of households in state-owned housing chose to purchase private property rights over their homes. The housing reform that began in 1994 transformed China into a country with one of the highest rates of home ownership in the world. The success of the reform in increasing private ownership of housing is demonstrated in Figure 1 , which displays the rates of home ownership among households living in urban areas. Home ownership rates increased from around 55 percent in the early 1990s to over 80 percent following the housing reform.
Institutional Context
Individual mortgage lending by formal banking institutions is less common in China than in a developed country such as the U.S. However, evidence confirms that informal sector lending was Since 1958, the Chinese state has controlled residential mobility through the household registration system, or hukou system. Households must have official registration to live in a specific city to live permanently in that city and to have access to social services there. The system's main impact is the reduction of migration of rural residents to urban areas. For a household that is registered to live in a given city, the system has no restrictions on residential mobility within the city.
Theoretical Framework
I develop a model to determine the impact of the privatization of state-owned housing on the equilibrium relationship between the market for state-owned housing and the market for private 6 housing. This model builds on the framework for rent control used in Fallis and Smith (1984) .
Their model demonstrates how the housing market changes with the introduction of price controls, which can be thought of as the stage prior to the initial equilibrium presented in my framework.
Initial Equilibrium
Consider an economy with two markets for housing: the controlled market for state-owned housing (c) and the uncontrolled market for private housing (u). While most units of private housing are owner-occupied and almost all units of state-owned housing are rented, the model does not directly embed the difference between purchasing a home and renting. For simplicity, I consider the the rental value of a privately-owned home as the price. Households cannot freely enter the market for state-owned housing because the state determines who receives an offer to reside in a state-owned unit and which housing unit to offer each household. While housing units vary in location, size and quality, I model differences across homes in terms of a single index of the quantity of housing services that they provide. 5 Households offered a state-owned unit have the option to refuse and enter the market for private housing.
There are a total of q households in the private market, and consumers in the private market are comprised of two groups. First, there are n households that are either not employed by stateowned enterprises or are employed by the state but have not been offered a state-owned home to rent at a subsidized price. 6 These n households do not have the option to participate in the price controlled market. The second group of consumers in the private market are the q − n households that were offered a state-owned unit. For these q − n households, housing in the two markets are substitutes and their decision between state housing and private housing depends on the relative prices and the quantities of housing services.
Aggregate demand in the private sector, D u , is the sum of each household i's demand for 5 Muth (1960) and Olsen (1969) introduced the idea that residences differ only in the quantity of housing services that they provide and that housing services are homogeneous and divisible. 6 The latter group may be on a waiting list for a state-owned housing unit.
7 private housing services, and is given by:
where X i denotes a vector of demographic characteristics that affect household demand, R u is the equilibrium price of a unit of housing services in the private market, d is the demand function for households without the option to rent in the state market, and g is the demand function for households with the option of renting in the state market. The total quantity and price of state-owned housing services, denoted byS c andR c , respectively, are exogenously chosen by the government. Furthermore, the amount of housing services that a specific household i is offered by a state employer is denoted byS ci and is also chosen by the government. The price charged and quantity offered in the state housing market,R c andS ci , are only relevant for the households,
, that were employed in the state sector and received an offer to rent a subsidized home. All households offered a subsidized housing unit have the option to participate in the market for private housing, but for households that prefer state-owned housing, their demand for private housing, g(R u ,R c , X i ,S ci ), equals zero. Figure 2 depicts the pre-reform market for state-owned housing. Supply is perfectly inelastic and the state supplies a total ofS c units of housing services. 7 The demand curve represents the willingness to pay of households in the market. The state chooses to subsidize housing, soR c < R * c .
The supply of housing in the private market is a function of price, R u , and a vector of variables that affect supply, F, such as local regulations on construction or land sales:
The value of R u must be such that state employees living in private or state-owned residences do 7 This assumes that supply of state-owned housing did not respond to the size of the waiting list for housing. Using province-level data available in the China Statistical Yearbooks 1985 Yearbooks -1988 Yearbooks and 1993 Yearbooks -1994 find no correlation between growth of state employment and subsequent construction of state residential housing. These results are available from the author upon request. This is consistent with the general consensus that pre-reform shortages and poor management of state housing were a large problem and motivated the reform (Wang and Murie 1999). 
Impact of the Housing Reform on Prices
By giving households the opportunity to purchase private property rights to the state-owned units that they had been renting at subsidized prices, the housing reform alters the equilibrium in the housing markets. It shifts out the supply of housing in the private market as the stock of stateowned housing enters the private market. Thus, the post-reform supply in the private market, S , increases by the exact amount of the housing services owned by the state before the reform, and is given by
where R u is the post-reform equilibrium price of a unit of housing services in the private market.
The proportional shift out of the housing supply that occurs as a result of the privatization of the stock of state-owned homes is upward-sloping as shown in Figure 3 . The increase in supply deriving from the former state-owned housing units moves with price due to improvements in the state-owned homes. The state-owned market has now combined with the private market, so the demand function in the private sector must include households that were formerly in the state housing market.
Post-reform aggregate demand is
where households indexed by i ∈ [z + 1, q] are the previous inhabitants of state-owned housing. The shift out of the demand curve from D to D is delineated in Figure 3 .
To understand the impact of the housing reform on the equilibrium price of housing, I make several assumptions. The model assumes that there is no transactions cost to moving. A large transactions cost to moving would dampen shifts in the demand for housing that correspond to the removal of price distortions for residents of state-owned housing. In addition, I assume that, conditional on differences in observable characteristics, X, the demand functions of households, g and d, are the same regardless of whether the household lived in private or state-owned housing. I discuss the plausibility of this assumption and present empirical support for it in Section 3.3.2.3.2.
This assumption produces the proportional shift out of the demand curve at each price.
The post-reform equilibrium price, R u , is given by
The impact of the reform on the equilibrium housing price in the private market depends on the relative shifts in demand among households in the controlled market, given by
and in supply,S c . While Figure 3 depicts a situation where supply and demand both shift out by the same amount, this does not have be the case. The net impact of the shifts of supply and demand on the price of housing is ambiguous and depends on the size of the relative shifts as well as on the elasticities of supply and demand.
The magnitude of the shift in demand relative to the shift in supply is determined by the system of allocation of state housing before the reform. The distortion in prices associated with state housing could induce households to occupy either more or less than the amount of housing they would choose to consume in the private market. If on average households were allocated to homes that were smaller (larger) than what they would consume at price R u , then the magnitude of the shift out in demand will be larger (smaller) than the shift in supply, and prices will rise (fall).
The next section formalizes the impact of the system of allocation on equilibrium prices.
Implications of Misallocation in Pre-Reform State Allocation
Before the housing reform, households living in state-owned housing could not choose the amount of housing services to consume because the unit was assigned to them by their state employers.
Households may have been willing to consume a vastly different bundle of housing in the state market than they would in the absence of price controls. I use the term mismatch to refer to the difference between the amount of housing services that households consume in the state market and the amount that they would consume if they were in the private market. 8 The quantity of mismatch experienced by household i, given by δ i , is equal to d(R u , X i ) −S ci whereS ci is the amount of state-owned housing allocated to the household. For household i, its household-level of the cost of mismatch at prices R u , denoted by ∆ i , equals R u δ i . The aggregate cost of mismatch of households in state-owned housing, ∆, at pre-reform prices is given by
where households indexed i ∈ [z + 1, q] lived in state-owned housing prior to the reform (so,S ci > 0 for i ∈ [z + 1, q] and z ≥ n). The value of ∆ equals zero if, on average, the state succeeded in allocating to households homes that were equivalent to the ones that they would have chosen in the private market. A positive (negative) value of ∆ indicates that households living in state-owned housing generally preferred more (less) housing services than the amount they were allocated by the state.
To examine the relationship between pre-reform misallocation and the change in the equilibrium price of private housing, consider the case where ∆ > 0. This means that
and households in state-owned housing preferred more housing services than they were given by their state employers. Combining this with the post-reform equilibrium given by equation 6 yields
Now suppose that the pre-reform price in the uncontrolled market is higher than the post-reform price (R u < R u ). Because demand is downward-sloping in price, this would imply
Given that equation 3 holds for R u , then at a lower price, R u < R u , the quantity supplied will fall and the quantity demanded will rise, and
However, adding equations 10 and 11 leads to a contradiction of equation 9. Thus, the case of ∆ > 0 must imply that R u > R u . Similarly, it is straightforward to show that ∆ = 0 implies that R u = R u , and ∆ < 0 leads to R u < R u . This result is quite intuitive. If residents of state-owned housing prefer to consume more housing services after the removal of price distortions, then demand will shift out by more than supply and the equilibrium price of housing will rise. If state employers were able to determine households' willingness to pay and allocated state units accordingly before the reform, then there would be no misallocation and households would not need to move after the reform. If no households change their consumption of housing, there will be no effect on prices.
This corresponds to the Figure 3 where supply and demand shift out by the same amount, and the housing price in the private market remains constant.
Testable Implications
The model demonstrates the economic implications of state misallocation of housing resources. In I test this prediction by examining whether areas where the average level of pre-reform mismatch (across all households) was higher also experienced greater increases in housing prices after the privatization.
3 Microeconomic Evidence
Data
The data used in this analysis come from the CHNS. The CHNS covers nine provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong), which vary con-13 siderably in their geography and levels of economic development. The survey was sampled with a multistage, random cluster design. Counties were stratified into three levels of income, and a weighted sampling technique randomly selected four counties in each province. In addition, the data include the provincial capital and one low-income city. The panel data set covers approximately 4,400 households in the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2004 . Thus, the data include three waves before and three waves after the beginning of the housing reform in 1994. While the survey contains both urban and rural households, the sample used in this analysis is limited to the urban sample because the housing reform was only implemented in urban areas. I define urban areas as neighborhoods where the majority of households have urban registrations.
I create a proxy for the quantity of housing services provided by a household's residence by using the market rental value that the household reports for its residence. 9 The rental value is converted into real 1990 RMB using a price deflator from the United Nations. The survey reports several dimensions of housing quality, including floor space, presence of a flushing toilet and electric and water utilities. The survey provides information about the current ownership status of the household's residence, but there is no information about whether a household received an offer to rent a state subsidized home. Table 1 also displays characteristics of the households living in the two types of housing prior to the large-scale privatization. The two groups are similar in the age of the household head and in the value of durable non-housing assets owned in real 1990 RMB. Durable non-housing assets homes, and the difference in household size may reflect a response to the limited floor space offered in employer-provided housing. The education of the household head was higher and the monthly income lower for families living in state-owned homes. 
Estimation of Misallocation
where the vector X ijt includes a cubic in age of the household head, the logarithm of the household's monthly income, and the logarithm of the household's total assets. τ jt are province-year indicators. The key advantage of the data is that they provide information about the same households before and after the reform. Thus, I develop an empirical test to evaluate the validity of the assumption that exploits the panel structure of the data.
Consider the case where the true equation for the value of housing consumption is Column 1 of Table 2 presents the estimates of equation 12 with a sample that includes the pre-reform waves of data (1989, 1991 and 1993) and households that were living in private housing during that period. The sample in column 2 includes the post-reform waves of data (1997, 2000 and The coefficient estimates in column 1 are used to calculate the pre-reform measure of ∆ s , while the estimates in column 2 are used to calculate the post-reform measure of ∆ s . The results indicate that housing consumption increases with income and wealth in both samples. Table 3 shows the levels of housing mismatch before and after the reform. By construction, the average level of mismatch for households residing in private housing is zero. Before the reform, households in state-owned units occupied housing that was 15 percent less valuable than they would have chosen in the private housing market. The difference in housing mismatch is significant at the 1 percent level. The post-reform results in column 2 provide support for the assumption 
Empirical Results
Misallocation and Household Residential Mobility
According to the theoretical framework, by allowing pre-reform residents of state-owned housing to adjust to their optimal bundle of housing consumption, the reform should increase residential mobility following the privatization among households in public housing units. More specifically, the probability of a household changing residences should be increasing in the amount of its absolute level of pre-reform mismatch. I estimate the effect of ∆ i on the propensity to move in the following probit regression:
where m it is a dummy variable for whether household i either moved residences or attrited from the survey in period t, X it is a vector of control variables, τ t are year indicators, and it is the error term. 11 The appropriate measure is the absolute value of mismatch, | ∆ i |, because households who were assigned too much housing should want to move to a lower quality home and have higher levels of non-housing consumption, and housholds who received too little housing from their state employers will also be likely to move to consume homes with greater levels of housing services. The estimate of β 1 should be positive in the post-reform period for households living in state subsidized housing prior to the reform. As a robustness check, I also examine the impact of | ∆ i | on the propensity to move or attrite in the pre-reform periods over a sample of households in state-owned housing.
The results corresponding to equation 14 are displayed in Table 4 . 12 The estimates in column 2 suggest that households with higher absolute values of pre-reform mismatch are more likely to either move or attrite. A doubling of the absolute value of pre-reform mismatch corresponds with an average increase in the probability of residential mobility or attrition of 9.2 percent. While statistically significant, the magnitude of the impact is fairly small. This may be explained by large transactions costs to moving. Another explanation, which is consistent with the large effects on housing consumption and prices presented in the next section of the paper, is that households in formerly state-owned units chose to invest in renovations to their existing homes. This can explain sizable increases in housing consumption and in prices without substantial changes in residential mobility.
The magnitude of the corresponding estimate in the pre-reform period is 3 percent and it is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The small and insignificant effect in the pre-reform waves provides additional support for the validity of the test because the mobility of households in state-owned housing was discouraged by the flow rental subsidy that households received.
Misallocation and Household-Level Consumption
In addition to increasing residential mobility, higher pre-reform household levels of mismatch should also correspond with increases in the amount of housing services that a household consumes. To examine this prediction, I estimate the following equation over a sample of households that were living in state-owned housing in 1993:
where F it is a measure of the quantity of housing services of household i's residence in year t. These measures are the logarithm of the floor space (in meters squared) and indicators for a flushing toilet in the housing unit, drinking water available in the home, electricity and lack of excreta around the dwelling. P ost t is a dummy that equals one in the waves following the reform. The vector X it includes household characteristics that may shift demand for housing services, including the logarithm of household income, the logarithm of total assets, a cubic in the age of the head, the education of the head, and province-year indicators. The inclusion of X it controls for changes in demand for size and quality driven by other changes, such as increases in household income or changes in the local prices of these housing amenities.
This specification includes ∆ i rather than the absolute value of ∆ i used in the previous regressions. In this specification, the coefficient of α 1 captures the impact of the pre-reform level of mismatch on that household's increase in housing consumption after the reform. 13 We expect the coefficient estimate of the interaction term, α 1 , to be positive. This would imply that households
with negative values of mismatch should be moving to homes with lower levels of housing services, and households with greater positive values of mismatch should consume higher levels of household services after the reform.
I also allow the time effect to have a more flexible form by estimating the following equation over a sample of households that were living in state-owned housing in 1993:
Relative to equation 15, the flexible specification allows us to examine time variation in the impact of a household's pre-reform level of mismatch. Table 5 are not statistically different from year1989 * ∆ i . The magnitude and the significance of the coefficients of the interaction terms shift immediately after the privatization of housing. The interaction of ∆ i with each of the three waves following the reform are significant and suggest an impact that is similar in magnitude to the estimates in Panel A.
The regressions on housing quality presented in Table 5 tell a similar story. In the parsimonious specifications, a doubling of the pre-reform level of mismatch corresponds with a 14 percent increase in the post-reform probability of upgrading to a flushing toilet and with a 6 percent increase in the post-reform probability of adding access to drinking water at the residence. These results are significant at the 5 percent level. The corresponding estimates of the flexible specifications generally display the same pattern of shifting immediately following the reform in both magnitude and significance. The exception is on the coefficient on year1993 * ∆ i in column 2, which is statistically different from year1989 * ∆ i at the 5 percent level. However, F-tests demonstrate that the coefficients on year1997 * ∆ i , year2000 * ∆ i and year2004 * ∆ i are statistically larger than the coefficient on year1993 * ∆ i at the 5 percent level. The results for the removal of excreta around the dwelling suggest that a doubling of pre-reform mismatch reduced the probability the the household still had excreta around the home after the reform by 5 percent. The results indicate that pre-reform mismatch had no effect on post-reform changes in the electrification of homes. This is not surprising given that electricity was already available in 99 percent of urban homes in 1993 (Table 1 ).
The estimates in Tables 4 and 5 provide support for the prediction of the model that the postreform shifts in demand for housing were driven by the pre-reform levels of housing misallocation of state-owned units. The results in Table 5 suggest that households living in state-owned units prior to the reform were residing in houses that were larger and higher quality following the reform.
This was driven in part by improvements to their existing homes and in part by residential mobility towards housing units that were more aligned with the preferences of households.
Province-Level Mismatch and Market Housing Prices
The previous two sections presented evidence in support of the demand-side implications of the model. This section examines the equilibrium implications on prices. According to the theoretical framework, the positive estimates of mismatch in the state sector in Table 3 indicate that the equilibrium price of a unit of housing services should increase following the sale of state-owned housing units. Given the lack of province or city level data on housing prices that extend prior to the housing reform in China, I test this prediction of the model with the CHNS data. I estimate the following regression:
where R ijt is the measure of the value per square meter of the residence of household i in province j and year t. I allow the regression disturbance terms to be correlated across years for the same province. This regression differs from equation 15 in three key ways. First, ∆ j is the average level of pre-reform mismatch over all households in province j rather than the household-level of prereform mismatch. 14 Post-reform changes in local housing prices are driven by the average amount of pre-reform mismatch in the local area.
Second, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the market value of housing per square meter rather than a measure of the quantity of housing services. The dependent variable in equation 17 contains both price and quantity. To isolate the impact of mismatch on the change in housing prices after the reform, the inclusion of household fixed effects, γ i , removes the impact of any time-invariant quality characteristics of each household's residence. Furthermore, the specification controls for changes in housing quality, Q it , including the presence of a flushing toilet, access to drinking water, the age of the home, dummy variables for water source (plant, ground water, well, spring and other), electricity and the amount of excreta around the home. Because the coefficient estimates of α 2 are time-invariant, they do not reflect price changes in particular housing attributes;
they only capture changes in the quantity of housing services, while the remaining variation in R ijt 14 ∆j in the empirical results correspond to ∆ in the theoretical framework.
is prices.
Third, I run this regression over a sample of households that were living in private housing in 1993 whereas equation 15 was estimated over a sample of households residing in state-owned housing in 1993. These three distinctions allow me to isolate the impact of misallocation in state housing on post-reform changes in equilibrium price levels rather than the impact on the quantities consumed by former residents of subsidized employer-provided housing. The model predicts that α 1 will be positive. Households living in areas with greater average levels of mismatch prior to the reform should experience higher appreciation in housing prices. I also allow for a flexible specification of the time-varying effects of province-level mismatch.
One concern with the specification in Equation 17 is that the coefficient on α 1 may reflect differences across provinces that are correlated with the pre-reform level of mismatch in an area.
For example, high rates of population growth in a province may increase housing mismatch if state employers do not respond at all or respond slowly to changes in the household composition of its employees. High rates of population growth may also increase the demand for private housing.
To address this issue, I include other pre-reform characteristics of provinces into the regression.
Specifically, I include interactions between time and the logarithm of the province's GDP in 1993
as well as the interaction between time and the logarithm of the population in the province in 1993. Table 6 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the market value of the home divided by the floor space. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by province in brackets. +,*, ** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Regressions also include the age of home, the source of water, indicator variables for whether the home had running water, a flushing toilet, electricity, excreta around the property, household fixed effects and a constant term. The sample is limited to households living in private housing in 1993. The fourth column includes the interactions between an indicator for years 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and the logarithm of province-level GDP as well as the logarithm of province-level population.
private housing prior to the reform. The last two columns in Table 6 correspond with the first two columns but control for time-varying effects of other province-level characteristics. The inclusion of these additional variables do not substantially alter the magnitude of the results, and suggest that the regional variation in the mismatch of state employees to housing was a driver of regional differences in price changes.
Welfare Effects
I calculate the welfare costs associated with the pre-reform system of state allocated housing to employees of state-owned enterprises. I measure the additional utility that households in state-owned housing would have experienced if they had received the market rental value of their subsidized apartments as wages and were able to choose how to divide their income between housing and non-housing consumption.
Estimation of the efficiency loss of housing misallocation requires information on households'
utilities. Household preferences are represented by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
where c is consumption of non-housing goods, h is housing consumption, y is household income, p h is the normalized price of housing and ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). There is a vector x of observable characteristics of the households that affect their preferences for the goods.
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint yields the following equation:
Using equation 19, I estimate the parameters of the model over a group of households that were living in private housing over all waves of the CHNS. The dependent variable is the household's self-reported monthly rental value of its residence. As in the estimation of quantity mismatch, the assumption for welfare calculation is that, conditional on observable characteristics, x, the utility that households get from housing and non-housing consumption is the same for pre-reform state housing residents and private housing residents. The results are presented in Table 7 . The relationship between household income and the rental value of housing is significant at the 1 percent level and implies an estimate of α equal to 0.946.
In order to calculate welfare gains, I need a measure of the quantity of housing services, h, that is separated from prices. I estimate province-year prices using the exponent of the coefficient estimates on province-year indicators from equation 12. I divide the market rental value of housing by this price measure to isolate the quantity of housing services of each household.
Combining the quantity of housing service with household level data on income and characteristics and the parameter estimates of α and β, I calculate the average welfare of households in state-owned housing and in private housing. As shown in Table 8 I implement the counterfactual to estimate the welfare implications of misallocation of housing. I calculate the increase in welfare that would result if the state sector had paid the value of the rent subsidies as wages, and households were able to choose their optimal amount of housing and non-housing consumption. This thought experiment assumes no changes in pre-reform prices and no tax implications of transferring the in-kind housing benefit into income. This results in a 25 percent increase in the average utility of pre-reform residents of state-owned housing (colummn 3) at no additional cost to the state.
The results suggest that the misallocation of housing by the state sector had substantial effects on the welfare of state sector employees living in subsidized housing. These equilibrium estimates for the welfare gains of removing the system of state allocated housing are lower bounds for several reasons. First, these estimates do not take into account the labor misallocation associated with the pre-reform system (Wang 2008) . Second, the framework does not take into account other possible distortions in behavior, such as the investment of time and resources into improving political connections. We may also think that these are overestimates because housing is also a financial asset, but this framework treats housing solely as a consumption good where the capital gains associated with increases in housing prices are not taking into account.
Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for understanding how the distortions associated with the system of state employer-provided housing affect housing prices in equilibrium. The theoretical framework describes a direct linkage between misallocation in the distribution of housing to state employees and the impact of privatization on equilibrium housing prices. I found that on average households in state-owned housing prior to the reform were occupying housing that was worth approximately 15 percent less than the kind of housing that they would have chosen to consume in the private market.
This misallocation implied a greater shift out in the demand for housing than in the supply as these households entered the private housing market. Households living in state-owned housing that was very different from their preferences changed residences and increased consumption of housing to get to their optimal levels. The net effect was a rise in the equilibrium price of housing of 7.5
percent. The system of state allocation of housing reduced the welfare of state-owned residents by 25% relative to a system in which housing benefits were paid as additional wages and households were able to choose their optimal consumption of housing. States. Many countries continue to provide housing to particular segments of the population, and this paper demonstrates that the economic consequences of privatizing state property can be substantial. While in the case of China, the housing reform increased equilibrium housing prices, the model demonstrated that the effect is ambiguous and depends on the pre-reform misallocation of housing. This analysis can also shed some light on other types of state involvement in the housing market. The framework can be adapted to apply to the general equilibrium effects of welfare housing or rent control.
